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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA KAY CLARK, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs- Case No. 970635 
CECIL E. CLARK, Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter "defendant"), submits the following as 
his opening brief in the above-referenced appeal: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, 
and Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order declaring a marriage between 
the parties, and divorcing them. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to enter the order of December 29, 
1997, or was it entered past the one-year deadline? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in declaring a "common law 
marriage?" 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann.. 30-1-4.5 
Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App., 1995) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court must review the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann.. §30-1-
4.5 (1995 as amended), and therefore the lower court's ruling, under a correctness 
standard. Utah Sign Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation. 896 P.2d 632; and 
Bunch v. Englehorn. supra. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant submits the following as a summary of the case. Other more detailed 
facts are set forth below as they pertain to particular points of argument: 
1. The parties were previously husband and wife, having been married in a 
traditional solemnized marriage. That marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 1986. 
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2. After the parties were divorced in 1986, they were separated for a period 
of several months. Then they resumed living together. They lived together 
continuously for several years. Once again, they separated. Defendant subsequently 
remarried another woman with the same first name, Linda Marie Clark, and is now 
married to Linda Marie Clark, whom he married on or about October 12, 1996. 
(Testimony of plaintiff, Tr. 8/13/97, pp.59,60,61). 
3. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, on October 1, 1996, seeking to 
declare a marriage between the parties pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §30-1-4.5. 
(R.O.A., 1-6). 
4. The matter came on for trial on or about August 13, 1997, to determine 
the issue of the alleged "common law marriage." At trial, a factual dispute arose 
between plaintiff and defendant regarding the date the parties terminated their 
cohabitation. Plaintiff contended that this occurred August 28, 1996. Defendant 
contended that this occurred in December 1995. The court found in favor of the 
plaintiff on this issue, determining that the cohabitation relationship between the parties 
terminated effective August 28, 1996. 
5. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an order declaring the 
marriage, and divorcing the parties effective with the date of that order, was entered 
September 29, 1997. A true and correct copy of that order is attached hereto in the 
appendix. 
6. From the entry of this order, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R.O.A.,311). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court lost jurisdiction in this matter to enter an order declaring a 
marriage, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §30-1-4.5, because the order declaring the 
marriage was not entered within one year of the termination of the parties' relationship, 
as required by that statutory provision and as required by the holding in Bunch v. 
Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App., 1995). 
2. The trial court erred in determining, from the facts in this case, that a 
"common law" marriage existed between these parties, because there was no evidence 
the defendant ever intended to be married to plaintiff, after their divorce in 1986, nor is 
there evidence he consented to marry the plaintiff. Further, there is strong evidence 
from the plaintiff's own tape-recorded statement and own hand-written statement that 
she did not consider herself to be married to defendant, after their 1986 divorce was 
entered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE 
ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE, BECAUSE THE ORDER 
WAS NOT ENTERED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE 
TERMINATION OF THE PARTIES' RELATIONSHIP. 
Utah Code Ann.. §30-1-4.5 provides, regarding validation of an unsolemnized 
marriage relationship, that the establishment of a marriage under Utah Code Ann.. §30-
1-4.5". . . must occur during the relationship . . . or within one year following the 
termination of that relationship " [Utah Code Ann.. §30-1-4.5(2)] 
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This statute requires that those who wish to establish a marriage to be 
recognized b\ law must obtain a courl un an administrative 01 dei esldbhblnnu n e 
relationship within one year of the termination of the relationship. Mere filing ~, « 
complaint for enforcement under §30-1 4 5 does not satisfy the one-year requirement. 
The order its »"!f iriii, iir'.ll hip PHII^ IPR "1 wth r inn year nf thip termination of the relationship 
sought to be declared a marriage ms is the clear holding in Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 
F 
In this case, the first anniversary of the termination of the parties' relationship 
occurred by at least August 28 d Q Q T Accordingly, the order terminating the marriage, 
\ itiiiii hi was entered in September, ham in nc siqned and pnlprpd mm or before August 
27, 199/ When A , . ^ S » ^7th came and went, the trial court lost subject IIIHIIPI 
ji ->ui i'wi supra. 
It might be argued by plaintiff that she complied witl i the statute by filing her 
complaint within the one year time limit (assuming the parties terminal :r 
relationship August 28, 1996, as plaintiff claimed.) This position was taken by the 
plaintiff in Bunch and expressly rejected by the Utah Court, of Appeals. 
II mifjhl I"MLI" .1111111?11 li i » petitions IIi.~if llns ("V.IIP A/as .,irldresserl fit lii.il in .irrfii"".! 
It clearly was not addressed, because it could not be addressed at the August 13, 1997 
year lii i litation issue argued at trial had to do with defendant's claim the parties 
separated in December of 1995 not August of 1996. This argument was rejected by 
tl i e i ' • .- - c - ) 
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Assuming for the sake of argument, that this Court should find that the trial and 
ruling from the bench on August 13, 1997 satisfies the requirements of the statute and 
of Bunch v. Englehorn. the declaration of a marriage in this case is still untimely. As 
set forth in the marshaling of the evidence below, the parties clearly separated in early 
December, 1995. Since the trial did not occur until August 13, 1997, and the ruling 
from the bench did not occur until that day, which was some one year and eight months 
after the parties' separation, the declaration of marriage was untimely. 
The evidence, which is further set forth in Point 2 below, establishing that the 
parties actually terminated their relationship in December of 1995, is as follows: 
a. The parties separated in December of 1995. The plaintiff obtained 
her own apartment at that time. She signed a lease agreement which provided 
that no one else, other than plaintiff, could reside at her apartment. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
pp.13,141). 
b. When plaintiff moved out in December of 1995, she took all of her 
personal property out of the joint home. She testified that she moved out "lock, 
stock and barrel." She testified: "I had had it. I had told him that was it." (Tr. 
8/13/97, pp.118-120). Plaintiff testified that, at the time she moved out in 
December of 1995, she considered her relationship with defendant to be "over." 
(Tr. 8/13/97, p. 122). She testified it was not her intention to go back to Mr. 
Clark. 
c. Defendant testified that, when plaintiff moved out in December of 
1995, he considered the relationship to be over. He testified: "We just cut it right 
6 
off. It — _, . .. was history;" He testified that it was his understanding, " . . . 
she wasn't ever coming back " ^ 
d. When plaintiff moved out of the parties" residence in December of 
1995, she changed her forwarding address, and instructed the post office to 
e. Plaintiff testified that, when she moved back into the parties' joint 
residence in June of 1996, her relationship was dilleient fr om the relationship 
she had had before. She described it as being "strained." Defendant was, at 
that point, actively and openly maintaining an intimate relationship with another 
vi niiii in i IIIII i In HI I n in in III in mi mi HI mi III i f I l l in "in .»i in in in,, IIIII in „ i IIIII I III mi I I T 1 " I(V, p TiT) rvfpm llliiii it 
testified that, when plaintiff moved back into his Magna residence in June of 
1998, he thought she was going to be there .. ••- s at the r i lost " II le slept 
in the basement and spent time with his fiance, i_». .^ a ,v.«, \e, staying one or two 
nights a week at Linda Marie's house. The plaintiff and defendant in this action 
< " mi note that 
this testimony about the pa ,
 w rangement after j-jne of 1996 went 
unrefuted by the pi I II 
f. The parties signed a written agreement in June of 1992, which was 
admitted at trial as Exhibit \ The agreement makes reference to the parties 
being single persons, and makes reference to their desire to separate their 
property and their debts " " . p . " ^ " ^ 
g . I III.IIIIIiillill mi i r t i e s 1 lldsll i m n i - i i i n i i i iiiiiiiiiiiiill 
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checking account after the December 1995 separation. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 122). 
After December of 1995, there were no further authorized joint uses of credit 
cards by the parties. (See TJ20 at Point 2A i i . , below). 
h. When plaintiff moved back into the defendant's Magna residence 
in June of 1996, she put her furniture in the garage. Defendant never consented 
that she could put her furniture back in his house. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.130). The 
parties' son-in-law and daughter moved the furniture into the house one day 
when the garage flooded. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 136). When defendant found furniture 
moved into the house, he told her to move the furniture and to move herself out. 
He changed the locks days later to enforce this ultimatum. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
pp. 157,158). 
i. Plaintiff filed an income tax return as a single person with the 
federal government for the 1995 tax year. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 139). 
j . When plaintiff returned to the defendant's Magna home in June of 
1996, she did not leave the Magna address with her former landlord as a 
forwarding address. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 143,144). 
k. Defendant testified that, at the time plaintiff moved back into his 
Magna home in June of 1996, he was already engaged to be married to the 
person who is now his wife. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 164). 
The overwhelming weight of all of this evidence is that the parties separated and 
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terminated their cohabitation, within the meaning of §30-1-4.5 in December of 1995. 
There is in reality, no credible evidence to suggest that the parlies actually resumed 
cohabiting together, and resumed their relationship as husband and wife, after 
December of 1995 ^u~~£—~ the entry of the order declaring their "common law 
marriaqfi1" in Augur I nl I'M, is gins'ilt IIIIIIMIMY | in ;III ml II Ilhe hnhlinci ill bunch v. 
EnglehornT supra. 
POINT 2. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DETERMINING, FROM THE FACTS AT TRIAL, THAT A 
MARRIAGE EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND/OR THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD INTENDED TO MARRY PLAINTIFF OR 
CONSENTED TO BE MARRIED. 
A. Marshaling of the Evidence. 
Defendant is mindful of his obligation to marshal the evidence and to 
demonstrate from the evidence wherein the trial :::: ::: it II Il: erred in find 
marriage." All of the evidence at trial, bearing on the issue of the existe x > 
sijIeiTiiiiiiizf1!!! mi mi i ,i mi, mi nil di)H b e l w i ' o n II iw p . i i l n v i i . a - i/s: 
i. Evidence favoring plaintiffs position: 
1. A neighbor "assumed" that the parties were husband and wife, becat ise 
they were "Lisa's mom and dad." (Tr. 8/13/97, p.24). I I te parties' former daughter-in-
law also believed them to be married to each other when she met them (T» 8/ 13/97, 
F • v H i i1" 
same last name, and they were "Kelly's mom and dad;' They slept in the same bed, 
petitioner cooked II u i 11 iiu'dlls, and they acted . -. .^ band and wife would act." 
2. The plaintiff, after moving out of the joint residence in December of 1995, 
moved back in again in June of 1996. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.11,12). 
3. The plaintiff moved out of the joint residence for the last time in August of 
1996. (Testimony of neighbor, Tr. 8/13/97, p.32; testimony of former daughter-in-law, 
Tr. 8/13/97, p.40; and testimony of plaintiff, Tr., 8/13/97, p.59). Plaintiff testified this 
occurred August 28, 1996. 
4. The parties' son, Kelly Clark, testified that the parties moved in together 
after their divorce in 1986, and "lived together then as a family" until their final 
separation. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.43). 
5. The parties shared payment of their routine household expenses from the 
autumn of 1985 until the termination of their relationship. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.82). 
6. For tax years 1985 through and including 1994, the parties filed joint 
married income tax returns with the federal and state governments. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.85). 
Starting with the 1995 tax year, the parties did not file joint married income tax returns. 
(Tr. 8/13/97, p.87). 
7. The parties had joint banking accounts during a portion of their 
cohabitation. The last joint bank account was opened July 5, 1994, and was closed in 
February or May of 1996. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.87). 
8. When plaintiff went back to the defendant's home in Magna on June 14, 
1996, she testified it was not her intention just to be there for a short while until she 
could find another place to live. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 123). 
9. Plaintiffs former landlord testified that the defendant came around during 
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the Christmas holiday season of 1995, and made an "anonymous" rental payment in 
plaintiffs behalf. 
ii. Evidence favoring defendant's position: 
1. The parties separated in December of 1995. Plaintiff obtained her own 
apartment at that time, and lived alone until June of 1996. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.11). The 
landlord's representative of the apartment testified at trial that plaintiff leased an 
apartment on December 5, 1995, which lease was effective through June 30, 1996. 
The lease allowed for no one other than plaintiff to reside at the apartment. (Tr. 
8/13/97, p. 141). 
2. When plaintiff moved out in December of 1995, she took all of her 
personal property out of the joint home. (Testimony of plaintiff, Tr. 8/13/97, p.62; and 
Tr. 8/13/97, p. 12). Plaintiff testified that she moved out because of defendant's 
relationship with another woman. She moved out "lock, stock and barrel." She signed 
a lease indicating that she was renting an apartment in December of 1995 as the "sole 
resident." The lease contained a restriction that she was the only person who could 
reside there for more than two nights. Plaintiff testified that, at this time, "I had had it. I 
had told him that was it." (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.118,119,120). Plaintiff moved out in 
December of 1995, because of the defendant's intimate involvement with another 
woman. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 118,119). Plaintiff testified that, at the time she moved out in 
December of 1995, she considered her relationship with the defendant to be "over." 
(Tr. 8/13/97, p. 122). She testified it was not her intention to go back to Mr. Clark. (Tr. 
8/13/97, p. 123). Defendant also testified that, when plaintiff moved out in December of 
11 
1995, he considered the relationship to be over. He testified: "We just cut it right off. It 
was gone. It was history." He testified that it was his understanding," . . . She 
wasn't ever coming back." (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 154). 
3. By as early as October of 1993, at least one of the witnesses who 
assumed the parties were married became aware that defendant had a relationship 
with another woman, when he took his present wife, Linda Maria Clark, deer hunting. 
(Tr. 8/13/97, p.37). In October of 1993, defendant told the witness, "you know, me and 
Linda aren't married." (Tr. 8/13/97, p.37). By plaintiffs own testimony, she knew by 
October of 1994 that defendant had an intimate relationship with another woman, and 
that this had been going on for about two and one-half years, as of October 1994. (Tr. 
8/13/97, p.86). 
4. Defendant married Linda Marie Clark, on October 12, 1996, after having 
had a relationship with her of approximately 3 years. (Testimony of parties' former 
daughter-in-law, Tr. 8/13/97, p.38; testimony of Linda Marie Clark, Tr. 8/13/97, p. 197). 
5. The parties' son, Kelly, had no idea whether the parties had joint or 
separate accounts, or how they managed their finances, after their divorce in 1986. 
(Tr. 8/13/97, pp.53,54). 
6. Though the plaintiff would "help in the business" operated by the 
defendant, she was never a signator on the business accounts. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.57). 
7. The parties were previously husband and wife, having been married in a 
formal wedding ceremony, and having been married for about 18 years. That marriage 
was terminated by divorce in August 1985. (Testimony of plaintiff, Tr. 8/13/97, 
12 
pp.59,60). 
8. When asked a question about her marital status, at trial below, plaintiff 
herself testified that she had not "remarried" since her divorce in 1985. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p.61). 
9. When the plaintiff moved out of the parties' residence in December of 
1995, she changed her address. (Tr., 8/13/97, p.52). When she moved out of the 
Magna house in December of 1995, she instructed the Post Office to forward all of her 
mail thereafter to her apartment. (Tr., 8/13/97, p. 127). 
10. Plaintiff testified that, when she moved back into the residence in June of 
1996, her relationship was different from the relationship she had had with the 
defendant before. The relationship was "strained." Defendant was actively maintaining 
a relationship with another woman, including buying the other woman a car. (Tr. 
8/13/97, p.63). Defendant testified that, when plaintiff moved back into the Magna 
residence in June of 1996, he thought she was going to be there "a few weeks at the 
most." He slept in the basement and spent time with Linda Marie, and stayed one or 
two nights a week at Linda Marie's house. The plaintiff and defendant in this action did 
not resume marital relations. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 156). 
11. In 1986, the parties had a residence on Settler Drive. This home was 
sold after the divorce, and the proceeds used to build on a family farm in Coalville. 
They lived at the "family farm" for about a year, and then plaintiff purchased a home in 
Magna. She purchased the home in Magna which the parties occupied from the late 
1980s until their separation, in her own name, without the defendant being listed on the 
13 
title of that property. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.64,65,114,115). 
12. Eventually, plaintiff conveyed titled of the home in Magna to the 
defendant. She testified that she did so out of financial pressure, but she nonetheless 
deeded the property to the defendant, solely, in exchange for $22,500.00 in cash and 
his payment of some debts. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.69,70,114,115). 
13. Within the 1985 decree of divorce, plaintiff was awarded rental properties 
in Coalville, Utah. These were jointly owned and operated before the divorce. After the 
divorce, title of these properties changed exclusively to the plaintiff, and remained that 
way. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.66,67). Those properties were sold in July of 1993. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p.67). By the plaintiffs own testimony, the proceeds from the sale of the rental 
properties went solely into the name of the plaintiff, and not into any account controlled 
by the defendant. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 111). At various times after the divorce of the parties, 
the plaintiff complained to defendant that she needed his help repairing or improving 
the rental properties. His response, according to plaintiff's testimony, was to offer to 
buy the property from her. He did not perform the repairs. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.71,72). 
Eventually, as stated, she sold these properties to third parties. 
14. The parties signed a written agreement in June of 1992, which was 
admitted at trial as P-4. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.73,74). The agreement makes reference to 
the parties being single persons, and makes reference to their desire to separate their 
property and their debts. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.73,74) (See also exhibit P-4 attached to 
addendum herein.) Though the parties did not change residences as a result of this 
agreement, there was a division of vehicles, and a closure of joint bank accounts. 
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(Testimony of plaintiff, Tr. 8/13/97, p.74). After June of 1992, and the written 
agreement between the parties, defendant paid plaintiff, over time, to purchase the 
Magna property. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.75). Though he missed payments, and was often late 
in his payments, plaintiff never attempted to enforce the payment schedule, and she 
eventually received the full amount due under the contract. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 110,111) 
15. Defendant filed bankruptcy in the 1980s, after the parties' divorce. (Tr. 
8/13/97, p.78). By the plaintiff's own testimony, the defendant was identified in that 
bankruptcy as a single man, and plaintiff did not join in the bankruptcy. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p. 116). Defendant concurred in this assessment. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 149). 
16. Though the parties shared their household expenses, plaintiff never kept 
track of how these expenses were shared. The expenses were paid out of plaintiff's 
separate account, defendant's separate account, or, until the joint account was closed 
in 1996, out of the joint checkbook. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.82,83,121). Defendant testified 
that he ultimately closed the joint account, "after she moved out," in reference to the 
December 1995 separation. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 163). 
17. Plaintiff never wrote a check on the last remaining joint checking account 
after December of 1995. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 122). 
18. Since the divorce in 1986, defendant purchased a recreational lot solely 
in his own name. (However, a policy of title insurance dated September 1994, shows 
"Linda Clark," with no middle name, given as an partial owner of the lot.) (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p.99, Exhibit 22). Defendant testified that he purchased the recreational property with 
a Ron Chilton for $22,000.00. Defendant testified plaintiff did not contribute anything to 
15 
the purchase of that separate property. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.161,162). 
19. According to plaintiffs own testimony, whenever she received money, as 
from the sale of the rental properties, or from her sale of the Magna home to defendant, 
she put those funds in a separate account, on which the defendant was not a signator. 
(Tr. 8/13/97, pp.110,111). As of the time of trial, plaintiff testified she had a total of 
about $37,800.00 in two separate bank accounts, as a result of these investments. (Tr. 
8/13/97, p. 117). 
20. After December of 1995, there were no further joint uses of credit cards 
by the parties, with the exception of plaintiff attempting to use a J.C. Penney account in 
July of 1996, to purchase some drapes for the house. Defendant called J.C. Penney 
and complained that plaintiff had no authority to use the card, and made them take the 
drapes back. The drapes were actually returned. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 123,124). With the 
exception of the attempt to use the J.C. Penney credit account in July of 1996, plaintiff 
did not sign any checks on any accounts, nor sign defendant's name to any checks or 
documents, nor attempt to use any other joint credit accounts. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.125, 
11.11-18). There was a misunderstanding on the part of a retail store about purchases 
in 1997, but the plaintiff herself intended those to be separate purchases. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p. 126). Defendant testified that he had had the J.C. Penney credit account before he 
and plaintiff were originally divorced. He testified that he believed he had removed her 
name from the account, and he had no idea how she managed to use it. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p. 164). 
21. Though plaintiff testified that she had had occasion to give defendant 
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$5,000.00 (see Exhibit 9) for the purchase of a Dodge truck, the defendant repaid her 
the $5,000.00 to cover the costs of that truck within a day or two. Though plaintiff 
testified that she gave money to defendant to purchase business materials in the sum 
of about $4,000.00, those monies were also repaid to her by defendant, in a check from 
his company. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 129,130). 
22. When plaintiff moved back into the defendant's Magna residence in June 
of 1996, she put her furniture in the garage. The defendant never agreed she could put 
the furniture in the house. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 130). Plaintiff testified that she thought the 
furniture was kept out of house, because carpet was being laid in the house, but the 
fact remained that defendant never agreed to have her furniture put back in place in the 
house. Defendant testified that he thought she moved back to the Magna home in June 
of 1996 because she wanted to get an apartment with a washer and dryer, and she 
needed a place to live for awhile, while she hunted for better apartment. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p. 156). Defendant never agreed to move the furniture into the house. The parties' 
son-in-law and daughter moved the furniture into the house one day when the garage 
flooded. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 136). Defendant testified that he helped plaintiff move her 
furniture into the garage, but did not tell her that she could put it into the house. He 
was gone to work one day and came home to find the furniture in the house. He told 
her to move the furniture out and to move herself out. He eventually changed the locks 
days later to enforce this requirement. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 157,158). 
23. The parties each signed a Last Will and Testament. Each party's will, 
executed in 1991, identified the parties as being "single." (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 131). 
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24. In September of 1996, the plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant, and handed 
it to him. The letter was introduced at trial as Exhibit 32. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 132). A true 
and correct copy of Exhibit 32 is attached in the appendix. In that letter, plaintiff stated 
to defendant: "I feel that if we were married, it would make a difference." She also 
stated,". . . I'd give anything in the world if you'd just take me away and get married." 
(Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 132,133). At the end of the letter she stated: "But I know it's not me 
you want to marry." 
25. Plaintiff also tape-recorded a message to defendant in November of 1995, 
in which she stated that all she wanted was "a ring and a piece of paper." (See tape, 
admitted as Exhibit 33 at trial.) Defendant testified that plaintiff had wanted to say 
some things that she couldn't say in person on the tape. On the tape, the plaintiff 
states (in November of 1995) that she wants the defendant to marry her. (See Exhibit 
33; and Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 165,166). 
26. Plaintiff testified that, when the plaintiff moved out of the defendant's 
Magna residence on August 28, 1996, she reported to the police that she had been 
"divorced for quite some time," and that she and the defendant were "living together." 
Plaintiff called the police because defendant had finally locked her out of the house. 
(Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 137,138). 
27. Plaintiff filed a tax return as a "single person" with the federal government 
for the tax year 1995. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 139). 
28. When plaintiff moved out of her separate apartment in June of 1996, 
though she returned to the defendant's Magna address, she did not leave the Magna 
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residence with her landlord as a forwarding address. (Testimony of landlord's 
representative, Tr. 8/13/97, pp.143, 144). 
29. Defendant testified, without contradiction, that plaintiff was dating a man 
in St. George named Joe Wilde between 1991 and 1994. (Tr. 8/13/97, pp. 149,150). 
30. Defendant testified that he attempted to be nice to plaintiff because: "I 
didn't hate her. I was trying not to be enemies. She's the mother of my kids. I went 
down and seen her. I took the grandkids down there." (Tr. 8/13/97, pp.154). 
31. Defendant spoke to plaintiff a few times, for approximately two years 
before his marriage to Linda Marie on October 12, 1996, that he intended to marry 
Linda Marie. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 155). 
32. Defendant testified that, at the time plaintiff moved back into his Magna 
residence in June of 1996, he did not consider it to be a reconciliation, and he was in 
fact already engaged to be married to the person who is now his wife. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p. 164). 
33. Plaintiff moved out, taking all of her furnishings and belongings with her, 
six or seven times during the course of the parties' cohabitation, according to the 
testimony of the defendant. He would buy other things and "just carry on" and furnish 
the house himself. (Tr. 8/13/97,p.173). 
34. The defendant's business partner testified that he (the partner) asked the 
plaintiff to do something in the business in September of 1995. Plaintiff became upset. 
She told the witness that she shouldn't even be doing the books because she and 
defendant were "not even married," and that they had been divorced for almost ten 
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years. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 189). She indicated to the witness that she did not believe she 
was married to Mr. Clark. Defendant's business partner also testified that in December 
of 1995, or January of 1996 (at about the time the plaintiff moved into her own 
apartment), the defendant's present wife, Linda Marie, took over the bookkeeping for 
the business. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 190). The partner also testified that, during the time of 
June and July, 1996, when the plaintiff had moved back into defendant's residence, it 
was clear the defendant was sleeping in the basement of the residence. (Tr. 8/13/97, 
p.191). 
35. Defendant's wife, Linda Marie Clark, testified that she married the plaintiff 
in October of 1996, having been engaged to him since at least January of 1996. Linda 
Marie Clark also testified that she had first told the plaintiff here, Linda Kay Clark, that 
Linda Marie was going to marry defendant, and that this occurred in about 1994 or 
1995. (Tr. 8/13/97, p. 197). From January of 1996 until June of 1996, Linda Marie 
Clark, defendant's present wife, stayed at the defendant's Magna residence two or 
three nights per week, and he stayed at her residence two or three nights per week. 
(Tr. 8/13/97, p. 198). She testified that she had also stayed in the Magna home on 
occasion in 1995. (Tr. 8/13/97, p.202). 
Defendant is aware of no other evidence adduced at trial by either party bearing 
on the issue of whether a non-solemnized marriage existed or not. 
B. No Marriage Existed Between These Parties After Their 
Divorce in 1986. 
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Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof at trial to establish the existence of a 
common law marriage, and the trial court abused its discretion in finding the existence 
of such a marriage. 
The statutory provision authorizing the existence of a "common law marriage" 
within the state of Utah, is found at Utah Code Ann., §30-1-4.5. This statute sets forth 
a number of elements which must be proven at trial, in order to establish the existence 
of a marriage. These elements are as follows: 
1. That there exists a contract between two consenting parties who; 
2. Are capable of giving consent; 
3. Are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
4. Have cohabited; 
5. Mutually assume marital rights, duties and obligations; 
6. Who hold themselves out and who have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife. 
Plaintiff failed to prove a number of these elements at trial adequately to 
establish the existence of a marriage by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff here to establish each and every element, and the defendant 
does not have any burden of proof in these proceedings. White v. Blair, supra. 
Plaintiff never established at trial, and the lower court never found, that 
plaintiff consented and intended to marry plaintiff. The great weight of the evidence at 
trial is that the defendant did not consent to marry plaintiff, after he was divorced from 
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her. After all, he was married to her at one time, and went to the trouble and expense 
to obtain a lawful divorce. 
It is the problem with showing consent in this type of case which has led this 
Court, in White v. Blair, to state that "the best evidence of marital consent is a written 
agreement, signed by both parties, manifesting their consent. (White v. Blair, at p.794). 
This Court has also stated that "the testimony of others who were present when the 
agreement to assume all marital responsibilities was made could also be highly 
persuasive." (White v. Blair, at p.794). In the instant case, there is clearly no written 
agreement, nor any occasion when the parties formally stated their intention to be 
married. 
It is true that other circumstantial evidence may be used to attempt to establish 
consent to be married in a "common law" relationship. However, what must be shown 
by all of this circumstantial evidence, with the burden of proof on the party claiming the 
benefit of the unsolemnized marriage,". . . is that at some point mutual consent was 
given." The trial court made no finding on this issue. Plaintiff cannot establish a 
specific point in time at which defendant consented. 
It is true that the parties filed joint income tax returns through and including the 
1994 tax year. However, in utter contradiction to this, they each executed a last will 
and testament in 1992, declaring themselves to be single. They held title to their real 
estate as single persons. In the only written declarations and recorded verbal 
declarations by the plaintiff on the subject, she clearly acknowledges that the defendant 
had not consented to marry her, because she is, at that point, begging him to do so. 
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In, cited with approval by White v. Blair, consent to marry was not found by this 
Court, even though the parties lived together for nineteen years, had had a child 
together, had a general reputation of being married, and had the mother of one of the 
parties living with them. This Court declined to find a marriage where the woman in 
that relationship had refused several marriage proposals, and some of their financial 
affairs were handled separately. [White v. Blair citing Maria v. Freitas. 832 P.2d 259 
(HI, 1992)]. In the instant case, though the parties lived together for at least nine years, 
until December of 1995, they kept most of their financial affairs separate. The plaintiff, 
certainly, was very careful to keep the rental property she was awarded in the decree of 
divorce, and the proceeds from the sale of that property, titled in her separate name. 
She was very careful to keep the Magna property titled in her separate name, until she 
sold it for cash from the defendant, pursuant to a written contract for sale of land. This 
is not the kind of separation of financial issues anyone would expect from a married 
couple. 
Other probative evidence which this Court has found may establish consent to a 
marriage may include: " . . . maintenance of joint bank accounts and credit accounts; 
purchase and joint ownership of property; the use of the man's surname by the woman 
and/or children of the union; the filing of joint income tax returns; speaking with each 
other in the presence of third parties as being married; declaring the relationship in 
documents executed by them while living together, such as deeds, wills, and other 
formal instruments." White v. Blair, at p.795 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the parties did maintain some accounts, checking accounts, 
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but primarily maintained the separateness of their financial investments. All of the real 
property has been owned individually throughout their cohabitation after their divorce. 
It is true and plaintiff maintains the surname of "Clark" as do the parties' children, but 
this should not be dispositive in this case. The parties were, after all, actually married 
to each other for a long period of time. It is quite common in our culture for divorced 
women, and especially those with children, to maintain the surnames of their husbands, 
even after divorce. 
Everyone at trial who testified as to the parties' reputation for being husband and 
wife, such as the parties' neighbor, former daughter-in-law, and the defendant's 
business partner, testified that they assumed that the parties were married. An 
assumption made by neighbors and acquaintances is not the basis for a finding that the 
parties actively held themselves out as husband and wife. The parties simply did not 
say, one way or the other, and friends and neighbors reached their own conclusions. It 
is important to note that, at any point when these assumptions became embarrassing 
(such as when the prospective daughter-in-law wondered why her future father-in-law 
had another woman with him at a deer hunt camp, or when the business partner 
wondered why the plaintiff would not help him out in running the defendant's business), 
the parties were quick to clarify that the assumptions were wrong, and that they were 
really single. 
The conduct of the parties during their cohabitation does not indicate an 
intention to be married. The plaintiff maintained a dating relationship with another man 
for three or four years during the period of cohabitation. (See 1J29 of the facts favoring 
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defendant's position, set forth above). Simultaneously, the defendant maintained an 
ongoing relationship with the woman who is now his wife, for years prior to his actual 
solemnized marriage on October 12, 1996. None of this conduct by either party was 
disputed by either party. This open conduct in dating others is not conduct commonly 
associated with an intent to be married, or consent to a marriage. 
It is important to note that the plaintiff cannot establish when the defendant 
specifically consented to be married to her again. The trial court simply went back to 
the time of the parties' divorce, when they first moved in together, and found that this 
was the beginning date of their new common law marriage. This is too simple an 
analysis. There is no indication that at any particular point in time the defendant 
consented specifically to be married. That is what this Court must find. 
The opinion in White v. Blair states as follows: "Care must be given to guard 
against fraudulent marriage claims . . . especially where a declaration of marriage 
would reap financial rewards for an alleged spouse. . . . When a reward is available, 
human nature may choose to strengthen and augment, in retrospect, the consent to 
marry that was only tentative before the reward became available. . . . Where financial 
gain is at issue, acknowledgment of marital consent by a woman and the man may be 
less persuasive if contradictory evidence is presented." The overwhelming weight of 
the evidence at trial in this case supports the conclusion that the parties did not 
consent nor intend to be married. Plaintiffs statements as to the alleged common law 
marriage are financially motivated, made after the fact, and therefore are less 
persuasive than the majority of the evidence. She is in this case seeking a thousand 
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dollars per month alimony, which was awarded, seeking ownership of the Magna 
house, which she already sold once to defendant for the sum of $22,500.00, cash and 
the payment of some debts. She is seeking an interest in two functioning businesses, 
recreational property in Southern Utah, and other parcels of rental property, which she 
apparently surmises are worth more than the $38,000.00 she has accumulated as her 
nest-egg since the 1986 divorce. Because it is clear the plaintiffs claims are strongly 
financially motivated, this Court must exercise greater scrutiny in looking at the 
establishment of a marriage. This Court cannot find such a marriage to exist, under 
this level of scrutiny, under the facts presented at trial. 
The law in Utah includes Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4,5, allowing parties to become 
married by process not traditional nor officially solemnized. However, the fact that a 
marriage is not solemnized does not mean that the state of Utah has adopted a 
procedure whereby persons can be tricked or fooled into a marriage, or can become 
married without intending to do so. Such a provision would create havoc. (It has 
already created havoc in this case where the defendant, believing himself in good faith 
to be a single man, married another woman in 1996. Later, he was declared in the trial 
court to be married, effective back to 1986, and he was not divorced in that declared 
marriage until the entry of the order in September of 1997. Are he and his wife now 
bigamists? What is the status of that marriage? That marriage was solemnized before 
the lawsuit in this case was even commenced. Defendant had no notice that plaintiff 
was making a claim of marriage. This is exactly the type of damage to be done and 
problem to be created by allowing a "marriage" to take place by default or deceit, rather 
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than by specific intent and consent.) 
POINT 3. THE TRIAL COURT WRONGFULLY DECLARED A 
MARRIAGE PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 
STATUTE. 
Until passage of §30-1-4.5, Utah did not recognize unsolemnized relationships 
as marriages. Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied 836 P.2d 
1983 (Utah 1992). In 1987, the Utah State Legislature enacted the section of the Utah 
Code allowing for recognition of unsolemnized marriages. 
In the court below, the trial judge recognized a marriage between these parties, 
and declared the marriage to be effective October 1, 1985. (R.O.A. 279). In other 
words, the court found that these parties had consented to and intended to create a 
marital relationship some two years before Utah recognized such marriages. This 
renders the decision of the trial court invalid. The court could not recognize a marriage 
effective before the statute was enacted. The parties could not create a marriage 
without benefit of that statute. 
Furthermore, since the trial court failed to find the parties had consented to and 
intended a marriage after the effective date of the statute, the trial court findings are 
inadequate to support a declaration of marriage. Before 1987, the trial court found 
intent and consent to marry, but the unsolemnized marriage could not occur. After the 
marriage could occur by statute, the trial court failed to make any specific finding of 
intent or consent. The lower court findings must fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the holding in the trial court should be reversed, and 
remanded for entry of an order that, the trial court having failed to enter an order by 
August 27, 1997, the court below lost jurisdiction to do so. In the alternative, this Court 
should issue an order remanding this case to the trial court for entry of an order that no 
marriage existed between these parties, because the facts at trial simply do not 
establish, as a matter of law, that a marriage could have existed, and because there 
was no consent by defendant to be married. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of May, 1998. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LINDA KAY CLARK, j FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
j CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, | 
v. ! 
CECIL E. CLARK, j 
j Case No.: 964904244 DA 
Defendant ! Judge:J. Dennis Frederick 
ooOoo 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on August 13, 1997, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. Plaintiff was present in person and represented by 
counsel, Suzanne Marelius. Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, Dean 
N. Zabriskie. The Court received and approved the Stipulation of the parties that in the event 
a Declaration of Marriage is made, that the marital assets would be jointly appraised and the 
parties would enter binding arbitration to divide marital assets. On the issue of whether a 
common law marriage existed, the Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received evidence, 
reviewed the Court file and record herein and being thus well advised in the premises, with good 
cause appearing does make and enter the following: 
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ate 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court has considered evidence on the issue of whether the parties have met 
the requirements for a common law marriage set forth in the statute at UCA §30-1-4.5. The 
Court finds that the evidence establishes that the parties have met all legal requirements of that 
statute and should be declared married. 
2. On the common law marriage elements, the Court finds that the evidence 
establishes the following: 
a. Both parties to this action are of legal age and capable of giving consent 
to a marital relationship; 
b. The parties to this action are both legally capable of entering into a 
solemnized marriage and in fact were previously married and divorce from one another by 
Decree entered in the Third Judicial Court of Summit County, State of Utah on or about August 
27, 1985; 
c. The parties to this action have cohabited and the Court finds that 
cohabitation to have commenced on or about October 1, 1985, and continued until the final 
separation of the parties on August 28, 1996, when the Defendant changed the locks on the 
residence and Plaintiff relocated to a separate home; 
d. The parties to this action mutually assumed marital rights, duties and 
obligations in numerous ways which will be set forth elsewhere in these findings; 
e. The parties to this action mutually held themselves out as wife and 
husband, and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as wife and husband. Among the 
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evidence supporting this factor is the consistent filing of joint, married income tax returns with 
the federal and state tax authorities from 1985 through 1994 (this return was filed 10-1-95 and 
was the last tax return filed before the separation). 
3. The Court finds that the parties mutually assumed marital rights, duties and 
obligations and have acquired a general reputation as a married couple and relies on the 
following specific evidence established at trial: 
a. Within a few months of their formal divorce in 1985, the parties 
commenced cohabitation and consistently lived together until August 28, 1996; 
b. The parties built a home together in Coalville, Utah, shortly after resuming 
cohabitation. They later moved to Magna, Utah with their children and purchased a residence 
in 1988 on 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah. The parties lived in this residence together 
until the final separation and jointly maintained, improved, paid for and enjoyed the benefits of 
this home ownership; 
c. In late 1985, the parties resumed parenting their children together until 
they reached the age of majority or were emancipated; 
d. The Plaintiff retained the married name of "Clark" and used this 
throughout the period of cohabitation, with Defendant's knowledge and consent; 
e. The Defendant purchased a new set of wedding rings for the Plaintiff in 
1989 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 16); 
f. The parties established joint credit as a married couple would do with 
Sears and JC Penney's (Plaintiffs Exhibit 17); 
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g. The parties established and maintained joint bank accounts for several years 
during their relationship, in addition to having separate accounts. The Court finds that there was 
no formal distinction during the relationship of the parties as to whether joint living expenses 
were paid from separate or joint accounts, and that said funds appear to be entirely commingled 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, 7, 8 11 and 27); 
h. The parties filed joint income tax returns claiming the marital deduction 
from 1985 through 1994, which was the last return filed prior to separation. These returns 
reflect that all property whether titled in the separate or joint names of the parties was described 
as marital property and both parties shared the tax impact of rental income, depreciation, etc., 
on such properties without distinction (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5); 
i. During the relationship the Defendant established several businesses which 
were operated together by the parties. These included Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning, 
Mark and Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning, K & S Properties. The Plaintiff worked on 
a full-time basis in these businesses doing bookkeeping, payroll, tax filings, record keeping, 
scheduling, and other general office work. Plaintiff was not paid a formal salary for these 
services and testified that she was working towards the betterment of the family finances and to 
augment the value of joint businesses. It is clear that Defendant relied on Plaintiffs ongoing 
services in this regard and that these businesses are jointly acquired marital assets; 
j . During the relationship the parties acquired personal belongings together 
and acquired real estate together, including the marital residence, the family businesses, a lot 
on Skyline Drive, rental property in Draper and a four-plex. At various times during the 
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relationship these assets were titled either in the separate names of the parties or joint names, 
as circumstances arose; 
k. During the relationship in approximately 1991, the parties each prepared 
a last will and testament which were reciprocal documents where each party left all interest in 
their property to the other party (Plaintiffs Exhibit 14, 15); 
1. During the relationship the parties routinely introduced one another as 
"husband" or "wife" and in particular, Defendant would make this introduction with the Plaintiff 
when he hired new employees for his business. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Jon Nash, 
a neighbor and friend of the parties for five years and that he assumed the parties were married 
and did not know that they were not formally married until the time of their separation in 
December 1995 as credible and reliable evidence on the reputation of the parties as married. 
The Court finds the testimony of Lisa Hart, the girlfriend of the parties' son since January 19, 
1993, and who also stayed with the parties for about three (3) weeks to care for Kelly Clark, 
that she believed the Clark's were married, based on their conduct and representations to her 
until Mr. Clark introduced her to a "girlfriend" at a later time, to be credible and reliable 
testimony on the conduct and reputation of the parties as married; 
m. The parties acquired vehicles together and paid for these vehicles from 
both joint and separate funds. The evidence establishes that Defendant bought a new 1994 
Dodge Ram pickup truck on July 2, 1994, and that Plaintiff paid the $5,000.00 down payment 
from her separate bank account (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9) which was later repaid to her by the 
Defendant); 
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n. During their relationship, the Plaintiff maintained insurance coverage on 
the Defendant's 1994 Dodge truck and paid for this from her separate account (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
10); 
o. Shortly after the parties resumed cohabitation, the Defendant restored 
Plaintiff as the primary beneficiary on his life insurance policy on April 15, 1986 (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 12); 
p. During the relationship, the parties paid jointly on life insurance for 
Defendant's mother, Roberta A. Clark, which premiums were paid from joint funds Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 13); 
q. Even during the separation of the parties which began December 1995, 
during their period of cohabitation, the Defendant would on occasion stay overnight with the 
Plaintiff and paid her first and last months rent and separate expenses, such as car repairs from 
his own funds (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20); 
r. Throughout the cohabitation of the parties and as recently as May 1996, 
on Plaintiffs birthday, the Defendant sent cards expressing his love and affection for the 
Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Exhibit 21). 
4. The parties purchased a marital residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, 
Utah, in 1988. Upon purchase of this residence, it was titled solely in the name of Plaintiff, 
Linda K. Clark even though the home was purchased with the joint funds of the parties. It is 
undisputed that this was done to preserve the asset during Defendant's bankruptcy proceedings. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a written agreement dated June 26, 1992, wherein they 
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agreed that Plaintiff would Quit Claim her entire equity and interest in the residence to 
Defendant for the sum of $22,500.00 payable in installments of $300.00 per month. The parties 
both testified that Defendant came up with this number based on his own opinion that the home 
was worth approximately $50,000.00 and that this was a fair value after the deduction of certain 
joint debts. The Defendant made payments under this agreement and often missed payments for 
as long as ten (10) months. In approximately June 1996, the Defendant made a balloon payment 
completing the financial terms of this agreement and Plaintiff executed a Quit Claim Deed 
transferring the entire property to Defendant. Plaintiff claims that she entered into this 
agreement under duress and pressure from the Defendant and that it was never intended to be 
a true agreement. 
5. The Court finds the Plaintiffs claims of duress and intimidation by the Defendant 
relating to the June 1992, agreement are credible and finds that the agreement is of no force and 
effect and is void. The Court finds Plaintiff's testimony credible that she would receive the 
$300.00 payments and would routinely deposit those either in the parties joint account or her 
separate account or otherwise use those funds directly for the regular joint expenses of the 
parties such as groceries. The Court finds Plaintiff to be a timid, unassertive individual who 
could be easily pressured to enter into such an agreement by the Defendant. The Court finds 
Defendant to be overbearing and capable of intimidation towards the Plaintiff. The Court finds 
credible the testimony of the parties' son, Kelly Clark that the Defendant is intimidating and 
would routinely take advantage of individuals for financial gain. The Court finds clear and 
convincing evidence that Plaintiff felt compelled to sign this deed and did not have a full and 
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fair opportunity to consult counsel or otherwise reflect on the consequences of her actions. The 
deed was prepared by Attorney Nolan Olsen, who was the divorce attorney for Defendant and 
who, for many years, had been the Defendant's friend and business attorney. The Court finds 
that this was not an arms length, fair transaction and that equity requires that the Agreement and 
deed be set aside and given no force and effect. 
6. Based on the Court finding that the agreement dated June 26, 1992, is null and 
void, the Court also sets aside the Quit Claim Deed, dated April 10, 1996, by Plaintiff to 
Defendant, transferring her interest in the marital residence. The Court finds that the marital 
residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah, is a joint marital asset of the parties. 
7. The Plaintiff is requesting an award of alimony. The Court finds that Plaintiff 
is currently employed full-time earning $10.00 per hour, which is a gross monthly wage of 
$1,720.00 and that she has a net monthly income of $1,309.00. The Court finds Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 26 to be an accurate statement of Plaintiffs income and expenses and finds that 
Plaintiffs reasonable monthly expenses are $2,409.00 per month. Plaintiff has shown a need 
for alimony. 
8. The Defendant has testified that he is unaware of his current income. The Court 
recognized Mr. Clark's reluctance to testify as to what his current income is for purposes of 
alimony, which the Court finds to be troubling and not credible. The evidence has shown 
inconsistencies in Defendant's statements of his income depending on the purpose for which it 
is being made, such as an application for credit or for purposes of divorce. The Court finds 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 39, the Uniform Residential Loan Application a verified document completed 
8 
by Defendant, June 20, 1996, to be the best evidence of Defendant's current income and finds 
that income to be at least $5,376.00 gross per month. It is clear that during the recent 
cohabitation of the parties, they acquired considerable assets and have had a very comfortable 
style of living. Plaintiffs Exhibit 30, the loan application completed by Defendant states his net 
worth to be $477,118.00. It is clear that the Defendant has the ability to pay alimony. 
9. The Plaintiffs request for $1,000.00 a month for alimony is appropriate and the 
Court awards her that amount retroactive to September 1, 1996. Plaintiff is thus awarded a 
judgment against the Defendant for alimony accumulated during the twelve (12) months this 
matter has been pending, in the amount of $12,000.00. This judgment should bear interest at 
the legal rate of 7.45% per annum until paid. Defendant should commence making ongoing 
payments of alimony to Plaintiff effective September 1, 1997, which should be paid by the 1st 
of every month thereafter. Alimony will be payable to Plaintiff until such time as she remarries, 
cohabits, or until alimony has been paid for a term equaling the length of the marriage of the 
parties, or until Plaintiffs death, whichever event occurs earlier. 
10. Plaintiff has requested costs and attorney's fees. The Court finds Plaintiff has 
established a need for fees based on her income and that Defendant's income is more than twice 
that of the Plaintiffs and he has an ability to pay Plaintiff her reasonable costs and fees. The 
Court directs the Plaintiffs counsel to submit an Affidavit of Attorney's fees and costs under 
Rule of Judicial Administration, 4-501 and that Defendant may file any objection to that request, 
which the Court will consider under the terms of that Rule. 
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11. The Court finds that all property acquired during the marital relationship, which 
extends between October 1, 1985 and the date of the entry of the Divorce to be marital assets. 
The Court finds those marital assets to comprise at least the heating, cooling and insulation 
businesses operated by the Defendant, the marital residence on 7492 West Jefferson Road, 
Magna, Utah, the rental property at 12251 South 500 West, Draper, Utah, the four-plex rental 
property at 3667 South 3325 West, West Valley City, Utah, the trailer and lot on Skyline Drive 
in Sanpete County, the life insurance with a cash value on the life of Roberta Clark, the 
snowmobiles, 4-wheelers, and vehicles consisting of 1988 Lincoln, 1995 Ford pick-up truck, and 
business equipment and vehicles, the wedding rings purchased by Defendant for Plaintiff, the 
bank accounts and any and all other assets purchased during the appropriate time by both parties. 
The Court approves the parties stipulation that all assets will be appraised at the joint cost of the 
parties, with jointly agreed upon appraisers. Thereafter, the parties will mutually select and pay 
for a mediator or arbitrator to make a final division of marital assets between the parties. Both 
parties have agreed to be bound by the decision of that arbitrator. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to return to her maiden name of "Hammond." 
13. The Court finds that during the marital relationship of the parties, they 
encountered irreconcilable differences and that a divorce should be granted to Plaintiff to be final 
upon entry. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its Conclusions 
of Law: 
10 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Declaration of Marriage based on the finding that the 
elements of the Common Law Marriage Statute at UCA §30-1-4.5 have been met; 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences, said divorce to become final upon entry. 
3. The Court should enter such orders regarding alimony, division of assets and 
liabilities as are consistent with the Findings of Fact. 
, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
I V O U.O a i W WWU.OJ.OtUJUL WIUXJ. UULW A JULIAJ.1 
DATED this N ^ d a v of k 
Approved as to Form: 
J. DENNIS^EDERIC 
Third District Court Jud 
r^y 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this _M_ day of S*P A^~ . 
1997, to: 
Mr. Dean N. Zabriskie 
Jamestown Square 
Hanover Building, Suite 370 
3507 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
S8\23417.ffc 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS -'2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
SEP 2 9 1997 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CECIL E, CLARK, 
Defendant 
DECLARATION OF MARRIAGE AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No.: 964904244 DA 
Judge:J. Dennis Frederick 
-00O00-
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on August 13, 1997, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. Plaintiff was present in person and represented by 
counsel, Suzanne Marelius. Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, Dean 
N. Zabriskie. The Court received and approved the Stipulation of the parties that in the event 
a Declaration of Marriage is made, that the marital assets would be jointly appraised and the 
parties would enter binding arbitration to divide marital assets. On the issue of whether a 
common law marriage existed, the Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received evidence, 
reviewed the Court file and record herein, and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing therefore, 
ft\e\n 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The above-named parties are hereby declared married effective October 1, 1985, 
having met all elements to establish a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5. 
2. The Plaintiff has established grounds for divorce from Defendant pursuant to 
irreconcilable differences and Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce to become final upon 
entry. 
3. The written Agreement entered between the parties dated June 26, 1992 pertaining 
to a division of equity in the marital residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah 
84044, is hereby declared null and void. The Quit Claim Deed signed by Plaintiff, pursuant to 
that Agreement transferring her interest in this residence to Defendant, dated April 10, 1996, 
is hereby set aside and declared null and void. This residence is a joint marital asset of the 
parties. 
4. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony payable by the Defendant in the amount of 
$1,000.00 per month September 1, 1996. Alimony will be paid by the 1st of every month 
payable to Plaintiff until such time as she remarries, cohabits, until alimony has been paid for 
a term equaling the length of the marriage of the parties, or until Plaintiffs death, whichever 
event occurs earlier. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for alimony accumulated during the pendency of 
this matter between September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997, in the amount of $12,000.00 
to bear interest at the legal rate of 7.45% per annum until paid. 
2 
6. Plaintiff is awarded all costs and attorney's fees incurred by her in connection 
with the above-entitled action. Plaintiffs counsel is directed to submit an Affidavit of Costs and 
Attorney's Fees pursuant to Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 and Defendant may 
respond or object accordingly. The Court will determine the amount of fees and costs pursuant 
to that Rule. 
7. The parties are ordered to select a mutually agreed upon appraiser to establish the 
current value of all marital property including the real estate and businesses established during 
the marriage. The parties are to pay the costs of these appraisals jointly. The parties are to 
select a mutually agreed upon mediator or arbitrator to oversee the distribution of marital 
property. The parties are to jointly pay for this arbitration and are to cooperate in good faith 
in that process. 
8. The Court finds that the marital estate is encompassed by all property, of every 
nature, accumulated either in the sole or joint names of the parties during the term of their 
cohabitation from October 1, 1985 through the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce. The 
Court finds that this property includes but is not limited to the following: assets that comprise 
the heating, cooling and insulation businesses operated by the Defendant, the marital residence 
on 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah; the rental property at 12251 South 500 West, 
Draper, Utah; the four-plex rental property at 3667 South 3325 West, West Valley City, Utah; 
the trailer and lot on Skyline Drive in Sanpete County; the life insurance with a cash value on 
the life of Roberta Clark; the snowmobiles, 4-wheelers, and vehicles consisting of 1988 Lincoln, 
1995 Ford pick-up truck, and business equipment and vehicles; the wedding rings purchased by 
3 
Defendant for Plaintiff; the bank accounts and any and all other assets purchased by both parties 
during the designated time. 
9. The parties are to cooperate as needed to sign titles, transfer property, and to do 
other things needed to effectuate the terms of this Decree and implement the Court orders 
herein. 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
DECLARATION OF MARRIAGE AND DECREE OF DIVORCE, this /7? day of 
71997, to: 
Mr. Dean N. Zabriskie 
Jamestown Square 
Hanover Building, Suite 370 
3507 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
S8\23417.dmd 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Foreign common-law marriages. where such marriages were recognized. In re 
This section did not render valid a common- Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 R2d 183 
law marriage entered into in a foreign state (1946). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d- — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage marriage which, though invalid where con-
§§ 79-102. tracted, would have been valid if contracted 
C.J.S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 4. within foreign state, 82 A.L.R.3d 1240. 
AJL.R. — Recognition by foreign state of Key Numbers. — Marriage o 17. 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out 
of a contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. ter 246, or the application of any provision to 
1987, ch. 246, § 2. any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch. remainder of the chapter is to be given effect 
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap- without the invalid provision or application. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1186; 
C.L. 1917, § 2969; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-
1-4. 
ANALYSIS 
Effect. 
Cited. 
Effect. 
This section has only prospective, and not 
retroactive, effect. Layton v. Layton, 777 P. 2d 
504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This section may not be applied retroactively. 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
This section establishes "common law mar-
riage" as a lawful form of marriage; thus, if the 
elements of Subsections (l)(a) through (e) are 
established, then a lawful marriage may be 
found to have existed prior to the entry of an 
order by a court or administrative body. Whyte 
v. Blair, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah 1994). 
Cited in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 
(Utah 1993). 
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A G R E E M E N T 
•This Acreemenfe. -&ad£ ^ancUentaeored i n t o t h i s ^r^? " aay of 
June, l&9$, by a.nd bi&tweexj C e c i l £* "CiafcK and 2/fbda Kay-Clark. 
w t f ^ E i S E f ff : 
WHEREAS, Cecil E. Clark and Linda Kay Clark were 
married for approximately twenty years and were later divorced; 
and 
WHEREAS, said parties have been living together fox 
approximately seven years and have purchased real and personal 
property during that period as well as incurred debts and 
obligations; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to enter into an 
agreement as to uhe division of said property as well as the debts 
and obligations. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of mutual covenants 
and agreements as set forta herein and other good and valuable 
consideration tne receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby 
acknowledged, tne parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. That Linda Kay Clark will convey by a quit claim 
deed to Cecil E. Clark a home and real property located at 7492 W. 
Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah. A copy of said quit claim deed being 
attached hereto marked Exhibit "A". 
2. Cecil E. Clark will execute a promissory note 
secured by a trusu deed as against the above real property in the 
sum of $22,500.00 and payable $300,00 per month commencing July 1, 
1992, together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. A copy 
of said note anc trust deed is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B" 
and "CH. 
3. The parties will divide the furniture, 
furnishings, fixtures and personal property which they acquired 
during the period they resided together. 
Z PLAINTIFFS 
| EXHIBIT 
M ? j T W c . U a ) A m 
4. Cecil E. Clark will receive the 1986 Ford pickup 
and Linda Kay Clark will execute the title to said vehicle and 
deliver said title to Cecil E. Clark. 
5. Cecil E. Clark shall receive the 19 91 Ford Crown 
Victoria automobile subject to the balance due Ford Motor Credit 
in the approximate sum of $5,800.00. 
6. Linda Kay Clark shall receive the 1988 Lincoln 
automobile. 
7. Cecil E. Clark will assume and pay Citibank 
Mastercard in the sum of $2,541.25/ Citibank Visa in the sum of 
$1,023.44; Mervyns in the sum of $110.19; J. C. Penney in the sum 
of $36.45; Discover Card in the sum of $654.95; Levitts Furniture 
in the sum of S171.61; and Valley Bank in the sum of $338.55. 
8. That Linda Kay Clark's equity in the home has 
been reduced by one-half of the above debcs and obligations and in 
the event thai: Cecil E. Clark shall default on any of the debts 
and obligations as set forth above wherein said creditors commence 
an action against Linda Kay Clark, or in the eveni that Cecil E. 
Clark shall default for mere than sixty days on the promissory 
note secured by the trust deed, it is hereby understood and agreed 
that the home at 7492 W. Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah will be 
placed for sale and sold at the earliest possible date so that the 
debts and obligations as set forth above and the balance due on 
the promissory note due Linda Kay Clark can be paid in full from 
the proceeds of said sale. 
9. Both parties acknowledge and agree that the above-
agreement was discussed and prepared by Nolan J. Olsen, Attorney 
at Law, and thar pursuant to discussion between the parties, Nolan 
J. Olsen advised said parties that each must waive any conflict of 
interest in thai: said attorney had represented both parties, and 
in executing this agreement said parties waive any conflict of 
interest and acknowledge and agree that this is their own specific 
agreement and that they have been advised that they have an 
opportunity to contact other counsel and have specifically 
requested Nolan J. Olsen to prepare this document which sets forth 
the agreement between fthe parties. 
EXECUTED the day and vear first above written. 
L ^  ^ 
LINDA~KAY~CLARK 
•*- S 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the "00 day of <J^-^ 1992, personally-
appeared before me CECIL E. CLARK, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he,, executed-- the. »f oregc ing-A 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
.. Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of *£L 1992, personally 
appeared before me LINDA KAY CLARK, who duly acknowledged to me 
that^she Executed "the 'FolreVoi^--'^ 
My c ssion_jexpires:_; 
- "' ~- & / 
^NOTARY PUBLIC 
;Residing ai/'Sa-ft Lake County, Utah 
^ 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
£tJ> r~ <- r/>.-
V'/e- ,^,^/V -"S^ -»/"> Space above this line for 
A-V/ y*, * C , c- ^>7<S Recorder's Use 
TRUST DEED 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this day of June, 1992, 
between CECIL E. CLARK, as Trustor, 
whose address is 7492 W. Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah 
(Street and Number) (City) (State) 
NOLAN J. OLSEN, Attorney at Law, as Trustee, and LINDA KARY CLARK, 
as Beneficiary. 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property situated in 
Salt Lake County, Utah: 
Lot 46, CENTENNIAL VILLAGE NO- 2, according to 
the official plat thereof, filed in Book "77-
02" of Plats at Page 39 of Official Records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder, 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and 
all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, 
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said 
property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness 
evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the 
principal sum of $22,500.00, payable to uhe order of Beneficiary 
at' the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set 
forth, and payment of any sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary* 
to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the 
above property, to pay all charges and assessments on water or 
water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to 
maintain adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, 
to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's 
and attorney's fees in vent of default in payment of the 
indebtedness secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees 
for any of the services performed by Trustee hereunder, including 
a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any 
notice of default and of any notice of said hereunder be mailed to 
him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
CLARK 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the 
ss 
X day of V (St* 1992, personally 
appeared before me CECIL E. CLARK,"the signer of the foregoing 
same. instrument, who duly acknowledged to me thathe executedJstie 
- ' ^ S v _ — ^ 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt"Lake County 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: when paid, this note, with Trust Deed 
securing the same, must be surrendered to Trustee for cancellation 
before reconveyance will be made. 
$22,500.00 Midvale, Utah, 
June , 1992 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and 
severally, promises to pay to the order of Linda Kay Clark, at 
/ Salu Lake County, 
State of Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may 
designate, 
TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($22,500.00), 
together with interest from date at the rate of eight per cent 
(8%) per annum on the unpaid principal, said principal and 
interest payable as follows: 
THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($300.00), 
on or before the 1st day of July and THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($300.00) on or before the 1st day of each month succeeding 
thereafter until paid in full. 
The undersigned acknowledges and agrees that he will pay 
property taxes and insurance commencing July 1, 1992, directly to 
Seller based upon the property taxes paid by the payees. The 
undersigned shall procure insurance on the residence and provide 
to,the Seller a copy of said insurance-
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of 
principal and interest or any part thereof, the holder hereof, at 
iolder~'s option and without notice or demand, may declare the 
entire principal balance and accrued interest immediately due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in 
the payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, 
the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree "co pay all costs and 
expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof 
severally waive presentment for payment, demand and notice of 
dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent io any and all 
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be 
granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other 
provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or 
any part thereof, with* or without substitution. 
herewith. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date 
/CECIL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CECIL S. CLARK, 
Defendant. 
Case No. DO.-I 954904244 DA 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
OF JUDGEfS RULING 
*y 
-*v. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JUD1 
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
on ofednesday, August 13, 1997 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
SUZANNE 2IARELIUS 
Attorney at Lav/ 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(301) 531-0435 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
Attorney at Lav/ 
350 7 North University Avenue ?,'3 70 
Provo, Utah 34604 
(801) 375-7(530 
ANNA 'A. BENNETT, CSR 
License No. 22-106796-7S01 
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THE COURT: All right. I have done a number of 
these cases where there's a claim of common law marriage, 
since the advent of this statute which some may argue is 
ill-conceived, but nevertheless, our legislature has seen 
fit to legitimize common law relationships under certain 
limited circumstances, and since that time, I've had 
occasion to rule on a number of these, and in this instance 
I am persuaded that the overwhelming evidence is that there 
was a marital relationship post divorce of 198 5, which, 
coincidentally, I granted. 
The persuasive, credible evidence is that within a 
matter of a few months of the time of that original divorce, 
which was granted in August of 1985, Exhibit 1, these parties 
were back living together as early potentially as October 
of 198 5. They built a home together. They moved to a home 
in Magna together with their two children. They raised 
their children to the age of majority. They used the common 
last name of Clark. They drafted wills which while state 
they are separate individuals and single individuals, the 
content of the wills is that they leave to each other their 
entire estate, Exhibits 14 and 15. 
The defendant bought rings for the plaintiff, 
Exhibit IS. There was a joint use of credit accounts, 
Exhibit 17. They maintained joint bank accounts, Exhibit 6. 
"I [They commingled funds, business rentals, hair salon, et 
2 cetera, through August of 1996, Exhibits 27, 13, 11, 10, 
3 9, 8 and 7. They filed joint tax returns through 1994, the 
4 last date available prior to the separation, Exhibit 5, 
5 from 1986 on. They jointly worked for the betterment of the 
6 family goals. Plaintiff worked in the business doing the 
7 books, records, banking, et cetera, taxes of the business, 
8 Exhibit 28. 
9 They, I find, introduced each other and/or held 
10 themselves out as being married. Their personal belongings 
11 were by and large together in the Magna home which they 
12 treated as if it were their own home, each of them, and 
13 therefore, it is my view that the statutory requirements 
14 of 30-1-4.5 have been met. 
15 Certainly one may testify and argue that this all 
16 was done without specific consent. That is, however, not 
17 controlling. Rarely do I have disputes of this nature 
18 where the parties come in and say, "Yes, I consented." 
19 I must, therefore, glean consent from conduct and actions 
20 of the parties. 
21 These parties were, in my judgment, capable of 
22 consenting. They were both adults, and after 1985 for at 
23 least a few months they were single adults. They could have 
24 entered into a solemnized marriage relationship during 
25 that time. They did clearly cohabitate and they mutually 
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assumed the rights and obligations and duties of a marriage 
relationship, and lastly, held themselves out as husband and 
wife. At least, it was implicit in their relationship 
that they indeed were husband and wife. 
Consequently, I determine that there was a common 
law marriage up to the date of August of 1996, at which 
time then the separation, the final separation occurred. 
I am, moreover, of the view that the claim of 
intimidation, duress, overbearing conduct on the part of the 
defendant vis-a-vis the plaintiff here is a believable 
Now, it may well be in the objective world, Mr. 
Clark's attitude and conduct is not such that one would 
find him to be overbearing or intimidating, but my observa-
tion of the respective parties here is that Ms. Clark, 
number one, is a person of considerable timidness, and I 
am of the view, therefore, that her execution of the deed 
incident to the Magna property was a situation she felt 
compelled to do, did not obtain independent counsel; 
indeed, used Mr. Olson who had been the longtime counsel of 
Mr. Clark and in fact represented him at the original 
divorce trial or stipulated divorce, and therefore find 
by clear and convincing evidence that she would not, but for 
these circumstances, have executed that deed for the sum of 
money that she received, that her will was overwrought, that 
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it was not an arm's length transaction. 
Consequently, I determine that it is of no force 
and effect with regard to her interest in that property. 
I have considerable trouble with Mr. Clark's lack 
of knowledge, or maybe just reluctance to acknowledge what 
his income for purposes of determining alimony is. There 
is considerable inconsistent information about what his 
income is, in all likelihood depending upon the purpose 
for which he's disclosing his income. 
In Exhibit 13, his application for credit, he has 
indicated that his income was something in the range of 
$5,376 a month, and that was during the time frame of June 
of 1996. In fact, it was executed June 20th of '96. I 
find that document most credible in terms of an assessment 
as to what his income is and therefore impute that income 
to him. 
He has considerable assets which he has acquired 
over the course of the relationship with this Ms. Clark, 
Linda Clark, the first, the plaintiff, and I determine that 
her list of expenses and income is such that she has shown 
a need for alimony, and that in that regard, her stated 
income and expenses in Exhibit 26, I believe, I find to be 
credible and that is her net monthly income is $1,309 per 
month and her expenses are $2,409 per month, leaving her 
then with a net shortfall per month of approximately $1,100, 
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and that her claim for alimony in the amount of $1,000 per 
month is neither exorbitant, nor is it in appropriate. 
I believe that she's shown a need for that and 
consequently award $1,000 per month in the form of alimony 
to terminate on the earliest of the typical conditions, and 
that that shall be retroactive to the month of September 
of 1996. 
In addition, I award to the plaintiff reasonable 
attorney's fees to be determined pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration. 
You submit to me an affidavit, and to Mr. Zabriskie 
likewise, 21s. Marelius, the amount of your fees, and then 
he will have the opportunity to object, and I will than 
rule pursuant to 4-501 on the reasonableness of the fees to 
be awarded here. 
The properties acquired during the course of this 
marital term that I have now defined are deemed to be and I 
consider them to be marital properties and therefore, the 
parties may and wil 1 submit the issue of distribution to 
binding arbitration as they have stipulated. 
Now, are there any questions? Ms. Marelius? 
MS. MARELIUS: My client would like to be awarded 
her name of Hammond, if we could add that to the Decree so 
it's clear. 
THE COURT: Insofar as this proceeding is concerned, 
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now that I have determined that there was a marriage, I will 
moreover determine that the parties are entitled to a 
divorce and grant the plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences in accord with the terms of the 
testimony here and give her her previous name back. 
Do you have any questions, Mr. Zabriskie? 
MR. ZABRISKIE: Your Honor, I would request of the 
Court a specific finding as it relates to the December date 
of 1995 as not constituting a termination of what had 
heretofore or theretofore been a relationship between the 
parties and that the Court is in effect discounting the six 
or seven months that — wherein the relationship was — 
TPIE COURT: Yes, I am specifically, by virtue of my 
ruling to the contrary, finding that that separation did 
not terminate the marriage relationship. In my judgment, 
it was one of more than one some separations between the 
parties. Maybe at the outset the parties figured that that 
was the end, but indeed, as was their habit and style, it 
was not the end. They reconciled, got back together. 
Consequently, I decide that that was not the termination of 
the marriage. 
Ms. Marelius, you prepare the Findings and Conclusion^ 
and Decree and submit those to Mr. Zabriskie for approval as 
to form. 
We'll be in recess. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
No. 22-106796-7801, and one of the official court reporters 
of the state of Utah; that on the 13th day of August, 1997, 
I attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the 
proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said 
shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, 
and the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 7, inclusive, 
16 I constitute a full, true and correct account of the Judge's 
17 Ruling only, to the best of my ability. 
18 DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, this 20th day of 
19 |August, 1997, 
20 
21 
22 
23 J IJ&UU _ // Atti^e&, CSJ^ 
24 | ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
Of 
LINDA CLARK 
I , LINDA CLARK, p r e s e n t l y r e s i d i n g a t S a l t L a k e 
C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h , and I b e i n g of sound and d i s p o s i n g mind 
and memory and n o t a c t i n g u n d e r d u r e s s , menace, f r a u d o r u n d u e 
i n f l u e n c e of any p e r s o n w h a t s o e v e r , h e r e b y d e c l a r e t h i s t o b e my 
L a s t W i l l and T e s t a m e n t , r e v o k i n g a l l p r e v i o u s w i l l s , c o d i c i l s t o 
• (w i l l s and p a p e r s t e s t a m e n t a r y a t any t i m e " h e r e t o f o r e made by me . 
ARTICLE I 
I, LINDA CLARK, declare that I am a single and that I 
have two (2) children who are now living, whose names are: 
Kelly Gene Clark 
Lisa Kay Ostimier 
I, LINDA CLARK, declare that I have an ex-husband and" 
the father of my children, to-wit: CECIL E. CLARK. 
ARTICLE II 
I hereby direct that the expense of my last illness, 
funeral, burial and all of my just debts and obligations and the 
cost and expense of administering my estate, including all taxes, 
fees and other charges, be paid and discharged as soon as can 
conveniently be paid after my decease by my personal 
representative hereinafter named. 
ARTICLE III 
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, 
real, personal and mixed, of which I may die seized or possessed, 
or to which I may be entitled, I give, devise and bequeath to my 
I * PLAINTIFFS 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
of 
CECIL E. CLARK 
I, CECIL E. CLARK, presently residing at Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and I being of sound and disposing mind 
and memory and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue 
influence of any person whatsoever, hereby declare this to be my 
Last Will and Testament, revoking all previous wills, codicils to 
Iwills and papers testamentary at any time heretofore made by me. 
ARTICLE I 
I, CECIL E. CLARK, declare that I am a single and thlit 
I have two (2) children who are now living, whose names are: 
Kelly Gene Clark 
Lisa Kay Ostimier 
I, CECIL E. CLARK, declare that I have an ex-wife and 
the mother of my children, to-wit: LINDA CLARK. 
ARTICLE II 
I hereby direct that the expense of my last illness, 
Ifuneral, burial and all of my just debts and obligations and the 
cost and expense of administering my estate, including all taxes, 
fees and other charges, be paid and discharged as soon as can 
conveniently be paid after my decease by my personal 
representative hereinafter named. 
ARTICLE III 
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, 
real, personal and mixed, of which I may die seized or possessed. 
Or to which I may be entitled, I give, devise and bequeath to my 
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G. STEVEN NEFF and BRADLEY T. JENSEN DBA NEFF & JENSEN 
INVESTMENT COMPANY 
GRANTOR 
of THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, hereby CONVEYS and 
WARRANTS TO: 
CECIL E. CLARK
 an unmarried man 
GRANTEE 
of THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, for the sum of TEN 
AND 00/100fS DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, 
the following described tract(s) of land in SALT LAKE County, 
State of Utah: 
Beginning a a point South 0 deg. 05fll" East 582.09 feet from 
the West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 3 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 
197.00 feet; thence South 0 deg. OS'll" East 132.45 feet; thence 
South 89 deg. 59f52n West 197.00 feet; thence North 0 deg. 
05fll" West 132.46 feet to the point of beginning. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING the following: 
A 30.00 foot wide strip of the above described property to be 
dedicated to Draper City for a roadway described as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 0 deg. 05fll" East 582.09 feet from 
the West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 3 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 
30.00 feet; thence South 0 deg. 05fll" East 132.46 feet; thence 
South 89 deg. 59.152", West 30.00 feet; thenceforth 0 deg. 05fll" 
West 132.46 feet to the point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO: County and/or City Taxes not delinquent; Bonds 
and/or Special Assessments not delinquent and Covenants, 
Conditions, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way, Easements, Leases and 
Reservations now of Record. 
WITNESS 
1996 
harod(s) s a i d g r a n t o r ( s ) , t h i s JUNE, 
G. STEVEN NEFF and BRADLEY T. JENSEN DBA NEFF & JENSEN 
INVESTMENT COMPANY 
GRANTOR 
of THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, hereby CONVEYS and 
WARRANTS TO: 
•1 
t 
fd m 
\ 
\ 
CECIL E. CLARK
 an utimarried man 
GRANTEE 
of THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, for the sum of TEN 
AND 00/100fS DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, 
the following described tract(s) of land in SALT LAKE County, 
State of Utah: 
Beginning a a point South 0 deg. 05fll" East 582.09 feet from 
the West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 3 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 
197.00 feet; thence South 0 deg. OS'll" East 132.45 feet; thence 
South 89 deg. 59f52" West 197.00 feet; thence North 0 deg. 
05T11" West 132.46 feet to the point of beginning. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING the following: 
A 30.00 foot wide strip of the above described property to be 
dedicated to Draper City for a roadway described as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 0 deg. 05fll" East 582.09 feet from 
the West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 3 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 
30.00 feet; thence South 0 deg. 05T11" East 132.46 feet; thence 
South 89 deg. 59f52" West 30.00 feet; thence North 0 deg. 05fllM 
West 132.46 feet to the point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO: County and/or City Taxes not delinquent; Bonds 
and/or Special Assessments not delinquent and Covenants, 
Conditions, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way, Easements, Leases and 
Reservations now of Record. 
WITNESS 
1996. 
hamd(s) of said grantor(s), this 20th day of JUNE, 
£. sflTVEN NEFF 
STATE OF UTAH, County of SALT LAKE ) ss; 
On this date, June 20, 1996- personally ^appeared before me G, 
STEVEN NEFF and BRADLEY T. JENSEN DBA NEFF & JENSEN INVESTMENT 
COMP the 'signer(s) of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged tch m^that they executed the same. 
My commission 
Residing in: 
expiJ 
SALT 
January 11, 
CITY, UTAH 
1997 
NOTARY °UBUC 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Residential Rental Agreement 
This Residential Rental Agreement entered into this 1 s t day of J l i lx 19_Sl£_ 
between r^r^l F. d a r k fSnrmy^ of 7692 West J e f f e r s o n Road 
£ S a l t Lake Ci ty ^ , Sa l t Lake 01 County of — 
State of Utah hereinafter called Lessor, and Charles R. & 
Barbara H. Clark of 12251 South 700 West 
. Draper , Salt Lake 
of- . County of 
State of IlLah
 t hereinafter called Lessee. 
WITNESSETH 
Lessor docs hereby lease and rent unto Lessee, and Lessee docs hereby cake as tenant under Lessor, the dwelling 
accommodations known 12251 South 700 West 
situated at Draper
 y C o u n t y rtf Sa l t Lake 
State of Utah co be used by Lessee as a lawful private dwelling from the 
Istday of Ju ly 1 9 _ I ! to thr l s t day of ^ # _ 2 0 0 1 
inclusive, a term «* f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s 
Said accommodations arc rented for occupancy o f _ z Adults and ~ Children. 
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, and of the covenants hereinafter expressed, it is covenanted and agreed 
as follows: 
1. Lessee agrees to pay to Lessor, or Lessor's agent, in advance, at the office of Lessor or said agent, in 
7492 W. 'Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah 84044 
,
 r. . , , , , . . r -J L r $600 .00 S i x Hundred on the first day of each month of said term, as rent for said premises, the sum of 
ment is made the essence of this agreement. 
-Dollars ($ ! ) per month; the time of payment of each monthly install-
2. Lessee shall not permit any unlawful and immoral practice to be committed on the premises; nor shall he 
permit them to be used as a boarding or lodging house, for rooming or school purposes, nor for any purpose which 
will increase the insurance rate; nor shall he permit to be kept or used on the premises inflammable fluids or explosives 
without the consent of Lessor; nor permit them to be used for any purpose which will injure the reputation of the build-
ing or which will disturb the tenants of the building or the inhabitants of the neighborhood. 
...
 Cj «._.* ~^~ -w^u^, u..w .*i-w i^w^u a^icci 10 Keep saiu premises in a ciean ana 
satisfactory condition, and, upon termination of this tenancy, will leave said premises, equipment and furnishings in 
as good condition as when entered upon, except for reasonable wear and tear or damage by the elements or by fire; and 
in the event oi damage or injury to said premises, except as otherwise provided herein, said Lessee shall pay for ail 
such damages. 
4. Lessee agrees to pay all electric power and light, gas and telephone charges; and for laundering of linens, cur-
tains, and blankets and cleaning of drapes, during tenancy and when vacating said dwelling, ii such are furnished. The 
Lessee also agrees to pay for cleaning said premises at the rate of $ "V" per day. 
5. Lessee shall not have the right or power to sublet the premises or any part thereof, or to transfer or assign 
rhis lease without the written consent of Lessor; nor shall he offer any portion of the premises for a sublease by placing 
on the same any "to rent/' "furnished room," "rooms to let" or similar sign or notice or by advertising the same in 
any newspaper or place or manner whatsoever without the consent in writing of Lessor. 
6. It is expressly agreed and understood by the Lessor and Lessee that the Lessor shall not be liable for any 
damage or injury by water which may be sustained by the Lessee or other person or for any damage or injury resulting 
from carelessness, negligence or improper conduct on the part of any other tenant or agents or employees. 
7. Should Lessee fail to pay the rent, or any part thereof, as the same becomes due, or violate any other term or 
condition of this lease, Lessor shall then have the right, at his option, to re-enter the leased premises and terminate the 
lease; such re-entry shall not bar the right of recovery of rent or damage for breach of covenants, nor shall the receipt 
of rent after conditions broken be deemed a waiver of forfeiture. 
8. Should the Lessor be compelled to commence or sustain an action at law to collect said rents or part thereof, 
or for damages, or to dispossess the Lessee or to recover possession of said premises, the Lessee shall pay all costs in con-
nection therewith, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
9. It is mutually understood and agreed that the Lessor and his agents shall have access to the leased premises 
at all reasonable times to inspect and protect the same, to show the same to a prospective purchaser, tenant or mortg-
agee, and to make any repairs thereto. 
10. Lessee agrees not to keep or maintain a dog, cat or any other animal or pet on the leased premises without 
the written consent of the Lessor. Three (3) dogs were approved by Sonny. 
11. Lessee shall comply with all the reasonable rules and regulations now in force by Lessor, and posted in or 
about the premises, or otherwise brought to the notice of Lessee, both in regard to the building as a whole and as co 
the premises herein leased. 
12. In the event the leased premises are furnished with furniture of the Lessor an inventory of the furniture 
shall be attached hereto and made a part hereof, and it is hereby agreed that all furnishings are received in good condi-
tion, unless otherwise expressly stated, and the Lessee further agrees to return the same at the expiration hereof in 
like condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted. 
13. It is expressly stipulated that there are no terms of this agreement different from any of the preceding 
numbered paragraphs or in addition thereto, except the following due to the low r a t e of rant THE t e n n a n t 
i s t o keep up the house and p r e m i s e s . A l l garbage and such to be Reept c l e a n a t a l l t imes 
Tennant t o pay a l l u t i l i t i e s b e c a u s e of cheap r e n t . Late f e e s ; $ 2 0 , 0 0 f i r s t day $ 1 0 . 0 0 
each day a f t e r u n t i l p a i d i n f u l l . R e n t t o be r a i s e d i f my c o s t go u p . 
14. All covenants and representations herein are binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns oi Lessor and Lessee. 
HEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their signatures and seals, the day and year 
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1. Single family residence. 
On Weds., 08/28/96 at 1301 hrs* I and Dap. Suarez 
were dispatched on a domestic dispute situation at, 
7492 W. Jefferson 3695 S. Upon arrival at, 1307 hrs. 
wc made contact with Ms. Linda K. Clark. She told us 
that she and flHHHLVHP had been married for several 
years but they had divorced and that a few jaonths ago 
they got back together and Bhe moved back in with him.j 
She now stated that they had been arguingabout his 
business' finances and that she left and now he had 
changed the locks of the home and refused to let her 
in to get her property, I asked her if there are any 
singed court orders in effect as to their property and] 
she told me no. I suggested to her that she contact 
her private attorney to seek out his/her advice on how 
best to resolve their property issues. She further 
told me that he carries a .357 revolver and also has 
a small cal. plstold that he carries. While tefcling 
us this he pulltyMj^n his bJue pick up truck Utah 
personalized: ^ H H e ^ a W I patted him down for weapon 
for the safety of all concerned, he had no weapons. 
The involved parties started up their arguing again £ 
I told them to contact their personal attorneys as we 
could not decide fr>r thorn their property issues. 
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